The Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Necessary or Nemesis by Minehan, Karen E.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Review Law Reviews
9-1-1996
The Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments: Necessary or Nemesis
Karen E. Minehan
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Karen E. Minehan, The Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Necessary or Nemesis, 18 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp.
L. Rev. 795 (1996).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol18/iss4/5
The Public Policy Exception to the
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments:
Necessary or Nemesis?
KAREN E. MINEHAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Hague Conference on Private International Law (Hague
Conference) will likely negotiate a multilateral judgments conven-
tion at its October 1996 meeting.' The inclusion of a public policy
exception as a defense against the enforcement of a foreign
judgment will be an important issue in this negotiation. Under the
public policy exception, a court may refuse to enforce a foreign
judgment because enforcement would violate a public policy of the
court. Such an exception greatly concerns both the practicing and
academic communities.2 One commentator described the contro-
versy surrounding the adoption of the public policy exception at
the European Communities Convention on Jurisdiction and the
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters
(Brussels Convention)3 as follows:
The public policy exception to Convention recognition and
enforcement has been criticised as having no place in a Convert-
* J.D., University of Pittsburgh Law School, 1996.
1. Congress 'authorized U.S. participation in the Hague Conference on Private
International Law in 1963, H.R.J. Res. 778, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
2. For critical analyses of the public policy exception, see JAN KROPHOLLER,
EUROPISCHES ZIVILPROZESBRECHT, art. 28, § 2 (3d ed. 1991); Berthold Goldman, Un traitj
fid~rateur: La Convention entre les Etats membres de la C.E.E. sur la reconnaissance et
l'exdcution des ddcisions en matiere civile et commerciale, 7 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE
DROIT EUROPIEN 1, 34 (1971); BULOW & BOCKSTIEGEL, INTERNATIONALER RECHTS-
VERKEHR IN ZIVIL-UND HANDELSSACHEN 606 (1983) (regarding the public policy
exception as an anachronism).
3. European Communities Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32, reprinted
in 8 I.L.M. 229, amended by Convention on Accession to the Convention on Jurisdiction
and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Oct. 9, 1978, 1978
O.J. (L 304) 1, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 21 [hereinafter Brussels Convention].
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tion whose scope is limited to civil and commercial matters to
the exclusion of those relating to personal status and as being
contrary to the principle of free circulation of judgments within
the European Economic Community.4
Critics fear that enforcing states will abuse the public policy
exception, thereby eliminating any potential benefits of the
underlying convention. Empirical data reveal, however, that
concerns over the public policy exception are exaggerated.
In Part II, this Article discusses the historical background of
the Hague Conference and analyzes the current status of interna-
tional judgments law. Parts III and IV examine the public policy
exception as applied to the two most prominent voices at the
Hague Conference: the United States and the European Commu-
nity. Part V demonstrates that neither the United States nor the
European Community have abused the public policy exception. In
Part VI, this Article concludes that the public policy exception is
necessary to ensure the eventual adoption of a multilateral
judgments convention because it allays the concerns of states that
are reluctant to join a multilateral convention without such a
"safety valve." Thus, despite concerns over possible abuse, a
public policy exception should be included in the upcoming Hague
Conference.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND CURRENT STATUS OF
INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENTS LAW
Examining the current status of the law is the best method to
understand the problems inherent in the negotiation of a compre-
hensive multilateral judgments convention.5 The laws governing
jurisdiction and judgments derive from a diverse combination of
international, regional and domestic laws. Thus, "the interrelation
between these three sources is often complex, whereby all three
may concurrently be relevant to one particular legal issue."6 This
4. PETER KAYE, CIVIL JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
1437 (1987).
5. For a general examination of the law concerning enforcement of judgments, see
Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of Foreign Money-Judgments in the United States: In Search
of Uniformity and International Acceptance, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253 (1991); ALAN
DASHWOOD ET AL., CIVIL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS CONVENTION (1987); KAYE,
supra note 4.
6. John Fitzpatrick, Comment, The Lugano Convention and Western European
Integration: A Comparative Analysis of Jurisdiction and Judgments in Europe and the
796 [Vol. 18:795
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combination of laws has resulted in a mixture of sometimes
conflicting and unpredictable rules that generally increase the cost
of commercial activity outside one's own borders.
In addition to the inconsistent enforcement of foreign judg-
ments, no multilateral judgments conventions extend beyond any
one regional market, except for the Hague Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or
Commercial Matters. 7 Some international rules, however, simplify
the procedures related to recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments. The Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and
Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (Hague
Service of Process Convention), for example, provides a multilater-
al framework for effective service of process.8 Likewise, the
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters (Hague Evidence Convention) facilitates the
"transmission and execution of Letters of Request and ...
further[s] the accommodation of the different methods which they
use for this purpose."9 These two conventions are examples of
international cooperation in areas that, though relevant, only
slightly aid the efficient recognition and enforcement of judgments
across international borders.
Within several geographical regions, however, regional
agreements facilitate the mobility of judgments against foreign
judgment debtors. ° The two predominant regional conventions
are the 1968 Brussels Convention," which governs the European
United States, 8 CONN. J. INT'L L. 695, 699 (1993).
7. Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, Feb. 1, 197, 1144 U.N.T.S. 249.
8. Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil
or Commercial Matters, done Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361; 658 U.N.T.S. 163 (entered into
force Feb. 10, 1969) [hereinafter Hague Service of Process Convention].
9. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,
opened for signature Mar. 8, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter Hague
Evidence Convention].
10. The United States, Ireland and the United Kingdom initialed, but never ratified
a bilateral judgments convention. See R. Doak Bishop & Susan Burnette, United States
Practice Concerning the Recognition of Foreign Judgments, 16 INT'L LAW. 425, 427 (1982).
The Inter-American Convention on Extrajudicial Validity of Foreign Judgments and
Arbitral Awards was negotiated in 1979, but the United States did not become a party.
Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral
Awards, May 8, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1224.
11. Brussels Convention, supra note 3. The Brussels Convention originated in article
220 of the Treaty of Rome in which the EU member states agreed to negotiate "the
simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of
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Union (EU), and the 1988 Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforce-
ment of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Lugano
Convention), 2 which governs the EU and the European Free
Trade Area (EFTA). The success of these conventions resulted
from the continued pressure on the communities to unite economi-
cally, monetarily and legally. 3
Unlike the EU and EFTA communities, the United States is
not a party to any international judgments conventions. To remedy
this apparent void, Edwin D. Williamson, the Legal Advisor for the
U.S. Department of State, wrote to Georges Droz, the Secretary
General of the Hague Conference, suggesting that the Hague
Conference negotiate a multilateral judgments convention to
include both existing Hague Conference members and other
countries.'4 In November 1992, a Hague Conference Working
Group "unanimously agreed on the desirability of attempting to
negotiate through the Hague Conference a new general convention
on jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgments."' 5
A subsequent Special Commission decided to place the question of
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments on the
agenda of the Hague Conference's Eighteenth Session in October
1996.16
Although this proposal to negotiate a multilateral judgments
convention through the Hague Conference has generated consider-
able support, member states disagree over how to draft the conven-
tion."7 Accordingly, this Article analyzes the ramifications of
judgments of courts or tribunals and of arbitration awards." TREATY ESTABLISHING THE
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY] art. 220.
12. Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 9, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 620 [hereinafter Lugano
Convention].
13. The implementation of both the European Economic Area and the Maastrict
Treaty markedly demonstrate this pressure. Fitzpatrick, supra note 6, at 699.
14. Letter from Edwin D. Williamson, Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State, to
Georges Droz, Secretary General, The Hague Conference on Private International Law'
(May 6, 1992).
15. Conclusions of the Working Group Meeting on Enforcement of Judgments, Hague
Conference on International Law Prel. Doc. No. 19 (Nov. 1992).
16. Conclusions of the Special Commission of June 1994 on the Question of the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
Hague Conference on Private International Law Prel. Doc. No. 1 (Aug. 1994).
17. The entire range of potential disputes, though worthy of much academic
examination, are beyond the scope of this Article. For a summary of the areas of
potential disagreement, see Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition Convention Study: Final
Report (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law
[Vol. 18:795
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excluding a public policy exception from the upcoming Hague
Convention by examining the crucial role of such an exception in
two jurisdictions, the United States and Europe.
III. U.S. APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
A. Foundation of the Public Policy Exception
In 1895, the U.S. Supreme Court asserted in dicta that a court
may refuse to enforce any foreign judgment that violates a public
policy of the court. 8 Theoretically, this exception may be easily
abused. A defendant may claim a public policy exception any time
a foreign court rules differently from how a U.S. court may have
ruled.19 Recognizing this potential for abuse, U.S. courts have
narrowly construed the public policy exception and exercised it on
rare occasions.2"
U.S. courts may refuse recognition of a foreign judgment on
public policy grounds only if recognition "injure[s] the public
health, the public morals, the public confidence in the purity of the
administration of law, or ... undermine[s] the sense of security for
individual rights, whether of personal liberty or of private property,
which any citizen ought to feel."'" A court may not decline
enforcement merely because a foreign judgment differs from local
public policy.22 To justify its refusal to enforce a foreign judg-
ment, a U.S. court must find that the judgment not only affirma-
tively acts on matters as to which local law is silent, but also
contravenes a crucial stated public policy affecting a fundamental
Journal); Peter Nygh, Report on Work Towards a Proposed Judgments Convention at the
Hague (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law
Journal).
18. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1895).
19. Jonathan H. Pittman, Note, The Public Policy Exception to the Recognition of
Foreign Judgments, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 969 (1989).
20. See Ackerman v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 841-42 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting the
"narrowness of the public policy exception," under which "the standard is high, and
infrequently met"); Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 201 (N.Y. 1918) (asserting
that "[w]e are not so provincial as to say that every solution to a problem is wrong because
we deal with it otherwise at home"); Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World
Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 931 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (proffering that "[tihe standard for refusing to
enforce judgments on public policy grounds is strict").
21. Somportex Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 443 (3d Cir. 1971),'
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972) (quoting Goodyear v. Brown, 26 A. 665, 666 (Pa. 1893)).
22. Ackerman, 788.F.2d at 842.
1996]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
interest of the forum. 23
B. US Enforcement of Foreign Awards Consistent with Its
Public Policy
24
To date, no U.S. court has enunciated a clear standard for
using the public policy exception. In specific types of cases,
however, U.S. courts have consistently refused to apply the public
policy exception and have enforced foreign judgments.
1. Loss of Goodwill and Attorney's Fees
U.S. courts have consistently enforced foreign judgments for
loss of goodwill and attorney's fees awards, even though U.S. law
generally does not allow these awards. In Somportex Ltd. v.
Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp.,25 the court upheld a $94,000
British judgment against a U.S. defendant consisting partly of loss
of goodwill and attorney's fees. 26 The court stated:
[T]he variance with Pennsylvania law is not such that the
enforcement "tends clearly to injure the public health, the public
morals, the public confidence in the purity of the administration
of law, or ... undermine[s] the sense of security for individual
rights, whether of personal liberty or of private property, which
any citizen ought to feel ..
In addition, in Compania Mexicana Rediodifusora Franteriza v.
Spann,28 the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court decision enforc-
ing a Mexican judgment, which awarded $6000 in attorney's fees,
against a U.S. plaintiff.29
23. Compania Mexicana Rediodifusora Franteriza v. Spann, 41 F. Supp. 907, 908-09
(N.D. Tex. 1941), affd 131 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1942).
24. The Hague Convention is not likely to include the following areas of law, where
U.S. courts have refused to apply the public policy exception: retroactive child support
(Knothe v. Rose, 392 S.E.2d 570 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990)); temporary injunctions in matrimo-
nial disputes (Cardenas v. Solis, 570 So. 2d 996, 998 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)); custody of
minor children (Adamsen v. Adamsen, 195 A.2d 418 (Conn. 1963); Herczog v. Herczog,
9 Cal.' Rptr. 5 (Ct. App. 1960)); and arbitral awards (Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron
Devices, Inc., 489 F.2d 1313, 1314 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974)).
25. 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972).
26. Id. at 439, 444.
27. Id. at 443.
28. 41 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Tex. 1941), affd 131 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1942).
29. 131 F.2d at 609; see also Victrix Steamship Co., S.A. v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B., 825
F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1987) (awarding a debtor in a Swedish bankruptcy proceeding legal fees
for wrongful attachment by creditor); Browne v. Prentice Dry Goods, Inc., No. 84 CIV.
8081(PKL), 1986 WL 6496 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (enforcing an Argentinean judgment for
800 [Vol. 18:795
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2. Court Costs
U.S. courts have also enforced foreign judgments awarding
reasonable court costs. In Desjardins Ducharme v. Hunnewell, °
the Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld a finding of defendant's
liability and enforced a Canadian judgment including court costs.
31
In Desjardins, the court stated that "[t]here is no real difference
... between the judgment of the Quebec Superior Court and our
own contingency fee agreements which are recognized as valid
measures of legal services rendered., 32 The court concluded that
the Canadian award of court costs was remedial, not penal, in
nature, and thus, enforced the Canadian judgment.
33
3. Repayment of Gambling Debts
U.S. courts have enforced orders to repay gambling debts
incurred in countries where such orders are, enforceable. In
Intercontinental Hotels Corp. (Puerto Rico) v. Golden,34 the New
York Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's claim that suits to
recoup gambling debts were contrary to New York's public poli-
cy.35  The defendant argued that, because New York law pro-
scribed gambling, all gambling contracts were illegal and therefore
unenforceable.36 In rejecting the defendant's seemingly sound
argument, the court reasoned that the "legalization of pari-mutuel
betting and the operation of bingo games, as well as a strong
movement for legalized off-track betting, indicate that the New
York public does not consider authorized gambling a violation of
& * ,some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal.' "" Thus,*
though gambling obligations were unenforceable in a domestic
action, New York's permission of some forms of gambling
attorney's fees even though a New York statute proscribed the awarding of attorney's fees
as being contrary to public policy). But see Ackerman v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 844 (2d Cir.
1986) (refusing to enforce a portion of a West German judgment for attorney's fees
because the plaintiff completed a study that the defendant did not authorize and because
"there was not a 'scintilla of evidence of work product' ").
30. 585 N.E.2d 321 (Mass. 1992).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 715-16.
33. Id. at 716.
34. 203 N.E.2d 210 (N.Y. 1964).
35. Id. at 212.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 213 (quoting Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 202 (N.Y. 1918)).
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suggested that the enforcement of foreign judgments for gambling
debts was appropriate. The New York Appellate Division and the
California Second District Court of Appeal have echoed this
willingness to enforce foreign judgments on gambling debts.
3 8
4. Prejudgment Interest
U.S. courts have enforced awards of prejudgment interest,
even where local law prohibits such awards. In Ingersoll Milling
Machine Co. v. Granger,39 the Seventh Circuit enforced a Belgian
judgment that included prejudgment interest.' The court found
that "the mere fact that Belgian law permits prejudgment interest
while Illinois law might not is not fatal to the Belgian award.",
4 1
The Ingersoll court relied on Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Lib-
ya),42 -where a Texas district court enforced an English judgment
including prejudgment interest.43  Although Texas law prohibited
prejudgment interest, the court found that this distinction did not
violate "good morals and natural justice" as to fall within the
public policy exception.'
5. Default Judgments
U.S. courts have also enforced foreign default judgments. In
Tahan v. Hodgson,45 the D.C. Circuit enforced an Israeli default
judgment that would not have been awarded in the United States
for two reasons. 46 First, the Israeli court entered a default judg-
ment based on notice requirements inconsistent with U.S. notice
38. See Aspinall's Club Ltd. v. Aryeh, 250 Cal. Rptr. 728, 730, (Ct. App. 1988) ("In
view of the expanded acceptance of gambling in this state as manifested by the introduction
of the California lottery and other innovations, it cannot seriously be maintained that
enforcement of said judgment 'is so antagonistic to California public policy interests as to
preclude the extension of comity in the present case.' ") (citation omitted); Crockford's
Club Ltd. v. Si-Ahmed, 450 N.Y.S. 2d 199, 203 (App. Div. 1982) ("Gambling in legalized
and appropriately supervised forms is not against this State's public policy.").
39. 833 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1987).
40. Id. at 692.
41. Id. at 691 (footnote omitted).
42. 492 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
43.. Id.
44. Id. at 901; see also Waterside Ocean Navigation Co. v. Int'l Navigation Ltd., 737
F.2d 150, 153 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that "[albsent persuasive reasons to the contrary, we
do not see why pre-judgment interest should not be available in actions brought under the
[Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards]").
45. 662 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
46. Id. at 868.
[Vol. 18:795
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requirements.47 Second, the Israeli court pierced the corporate
veil and entered a judgment against the defendant in violation of
U.S. public policy.48 The Tahan court, however, found that Israeli
notice requirements are not "so 'repugnant to fundamental notions
of what is decent and just' that [U.S.] public policy requires non-
enforcement of the [Israeli] judgment."49 In addition, the court
rationalized that the defendant could have appeared in the Israeli
court and presented a viable defense, so he could not "fail to
contest the Israeli plaintiff and then declare that he would have
won."5 The court held that the "Israeli court's decision to pierce
the corporate veil is not 'repugnant' . . . , particularly when it is
borne in mind that defendant did not present a case [in the Israeli
action]."51
6. Actions in Seduction and Damages for Moral Reparations
U.S. courts have even enforced foreign judgments based on
causes of action that do not exist in the United States. For
example, in Neporany v. Kir,52 the New York Appellate Division
upheld the enforcement of a Canadian judgment for seduction
because "our public policy is not contravened by the enforcement
of a money judgment arising from causes of action proscribed by
Article 2-A, but which are recognized in the jurisdiction where the
acts took place."53  In addition, in Gutierrez v. Collins,54 the
Texas Supreme Court enforced a Mexican judgment in a negli-
gence action that included damages for moral reparations (i.e.
injuries to plaintiff's "reputation, dignity or honor"), even though
such a cause of action did not exist under Texas law. The court
reasoned that the "mere fact that these aspects of the law differ
from ours does not render them violative of public policy" and that
"there is nothing in the substance of these laws inimical to good
morals, natural justice, or the general interests of the citizens of
47. Id. at 866.
48. Id. at 867.
49. Id. at 866.
50. Id. at 867.
51. Id. (footnote omitted).
52. 173 N.Y.S.2d 146, 148 (App. Div. 1958).
53. Id. at 148.
54. 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979).
55. Id. at 321-22.
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this state."56
7. Injuries Incurred During Deportation
Moreover, U.S. courts have enforced foreign awards even
though the judgments are "in some conflict with ... obligations of
the United States., 57 In Ricart v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc.,58 a D.C. Circuit district court upheld a Dominican Republic
judgment for damages incurred when the defendant airline
deported the plaintiff.59 The court did concede, however, that the
judgment "may put the defendant in somewhat of a predicament
if it must choose obedience to the immigration authorities of any
particular country at some risk of civil liability to a deported
passenger., 60  By narrowly interpreting the public policy excep-
tion, the court essentially required a potential defendant to choose
between sanctions by the immigration authorities or potential civil
liability.
8. Summary
In sum, U.S. courts have enforced foreign judgments based on
causes of action that either do not exist under or vary from U.S.
law. U.S. courts have enforced foreign damage awards that would
not be granted in the United States. U.S. courts have thus
exhibited a profound tendency towards the liberal enforcement of
foreign judgments that would not normally be awarded in U.S.
,courts.
C. US. Denial of Enforcement of Foreign Awards Contrary to
Its Public Policy
61
U.S. courts have also consistently applied the public policy
exception in other types of cases and denied enforcement of
foreign judgments.
56. Id. at 322.
57. No. CIV.A.89-0768(HHG), 1990 WL 236080, at *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 21, 1990).
58. Id. at *1.
59. Id. at *3.
60. Id.
61. The Hague Convention is not likely to cover the following areas of law, where U.S.
courts have applied the public policy exception: tax assessment (Overseas Inns S.A. P.A.
v. United States, 685 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Tex. 1988)); antitrust (Laker Airways Ltd. v.
Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984)); and adoption (Barry E.
v. Ingraham, 371 N.E.2d 492, (N.Y. 1977); In re Juan P.H.C., 496 N.Y.S.2d 630 (Sur. Ct.
1985); Estate of O'Dea, 105 Cal. Rptr. 756 (Ct. App. 1973)).
.[Vol. 18:795
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1. Awards Related to Wrongdoer's Malfeasance
U.S. courts have consistently refused to enforce foreign
judgments where the wrongdoer, most often a fugitive from justice,
seeks to enforce a judgment for damages related to his wrongdoing.
For example, in Jaffe v. Snow,62 the Florida District Court of
Appeals refused to enforce a Canadian judgment awarding
damages to a plaintiff who disregarded bail terms and was
subsequently kidnapped and injured when a bondsman forcibly
returned him to Florida.63 The court found that " 'a fugitive from
justice is not entitled to call upon the resources of court for
determination of his case.' "' In other words, "a fugitive from
justice 'cannot eat his cake and have it too.' ,65
In United States v. $45,940 in Currency,' the Second Circuit
denied enforcement of a Canadian judgment in a forfeiture
proceeding brought by the defendant, another fugitive from
justice.67 The court concluded that the defendant "waived his
right to due process in the civil forfeiture proceeding by remaining
a fugitive.,
68
In these cases, U.S. courts relied on the public policy exception
to deny enforcement of foreign judgments that would reward a
wrongdoer for his or her malfeasance. To hold otherwise would
result in the court's effective approval of the claimant's initial
wrongdoing, a practice that would defy the very core of the U.S.
justice system.
2. Libel Judgments
U.S. courts have also invoked the public policy exception and
rejected foreign libel judgments where the foreign standards are
repugnant to both local public policy and the U.S. Constitution. In
62. 610 So. 2d 482 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
63. Id. at 484-85.
64. Id. at 486 (quoting Garcia v. Metro-Dade Police Dep't, 576 So. 2d 751, 752 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1991); United States v. One Lot of U.S. Currency Totalling $506,537, 628
F. Supp. 1473, 1475 (S.D. Fla. 1986)).
65. Id. (quoting United States v. Eng., 951 F.2d 461, 462 (2d Cir. 1991)).
66. 739 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1984).
67. Id. at 798; see also United States v. 7707 S.W. 74th Lane, 868 F.2d 1214 (11th Cir.
1989); United States v. 760 S.W. 1st St., 702 F. Supp. 575 (W.D.N.C. 1989) (both denying
enforcement of a Columbian judgment in a forfeiture proceeding because the -defendant
was a fugitive from justice in a drug prosecution).
68. $45,940 in Currency, 739 F.2d at 798.
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Matusevitch v. Telnikoff,69 a D.C. Circuit district court held that
the recognition and enforcement of a British libel judgment would
violate Maryland's public policy, as well as deprive the plaintiff of
his constitutional rights.7" In England, a defendant in a libel
action may be held liable for statements that the defendant
honestly believed to be true and that were published without any
negligence.71 By contrast, U.S. law requires the plaintiff to prove
that the statements were false and that the defendant had the
requisite intent to commit libel.72 In Matusevitch, the court found
no proof that the defendant's statements were made with actual
malice and held that the defendant was entitled to the protection
of his right to free speech.73 Thus, the court refused to enforce
the foreign judgment.
In Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications Inc.,7" a New York
state court refused to recognize a English libel judgment against a
New York news service operator because the judgment had been
imposed without any safeguards for freedom of speech and press,
as mandated by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
75
The court reasoned that
if, as claimed by defendant, the public policy to which the
foreign judgment is repugnant is embodied in the First Amend-
ment to the [U.S.] Constitution or the free speech guaranty of
the Constitution of this State, the refusal to recognize the
judgment should be, and it is deemed to be, 'constitutionally
mandatory.'
76
These cases suggest that where the judgment violates the U.S.
Constitution, the judgment works as " 'a direct violation of the
policy of our laws, and do violence to what we deem the rights of
our citizens.' ,77 Thus, according to the Bachchan court, refusal
69. 877 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1995).
70. Id. at 2.
71. Id. at 4.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 4, 6; see also Abdullah v. Sheridan Square Press, Inc., No. 93 CIV.2525 (-
LLS), 1994 WL 419847, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 1994) (refusing to enforce British libel
judgment because the "establishment of a claim for libel under the British law of
defamation would be antithetical to the First Amendment protection accorded to
defendants").
74. 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 662.
77. Matusevitch, 877 F. Supp. at 3 (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 193 (1805)).
806 [Vol. 18:795
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of recognition is "constitutionally mandatory., 7
8
3. Penal Sanctions
Finally, U.S. courts have refused to enforce judgments that are
penal in nature. If a judgment serves to "punish an offense against
the public justice of the state, or to afford a private remedy to a
person injured by the wrongful act" of the defendant, U.S. courts
will invoke the public policy exception.79
In the Republic of the Philippines v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp.,8° for example, the New Jersey District Court refused to
enforce a judgment that included sanctions, which the Republic of
the Philippines brought against the defendant corporation.8'
Because the defendant's actions affected the whole community, the
Philippine court imposed these penalties to deter wanton acts "'by
way of example or correction for the public good,' " not to
compensate the plaintiff.82 Thus, the court refused to enforce the
penal sanctions of the Philippine judgment.83
There is little concern that U.S. courts will abuse the "penal
sanction" exception because they have tended to narrowly define
the exception. The Westinghouse Electric Corp. court noted that
although New Jersey has adopted Chief Justice John Marshall's
admonition that "the Courts of no country execute the penal laws
of another,"' New Jersey has found non-penal purposes in laws
that appear to impose penalties. 85 For example, in an enforce-
ment action between state courts, the New Jersey Supreme Court
compelled the defendants to pay the fees of relatives, who were
receiving services at a state facility, by interpreting Pennsylvania
statute's purpose as providing familial obligations, rather than
imposing penalties.8 6
78. Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 662.
79. Huntingon v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 673-74 (1892).
80. 821 F. Supp. 292 (D.N.J. 1993).
81. Id. The Philippine court imposed sanctions in tort and contract claims against the
defendant, who allegedly bribed President Marcos to obtain state contracts.
82. Id. at 298 (citation omitted).
83. Id. at 292.
84. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825).
85. Pennhurst State Sch. v. Estate of Goodhartz, 200 A.2d 112 (N.J. 1964).
86. Id.; New York v. Sacco, 577 A.2d 1333 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1990); City of
Phila. v. Smith, 413 A.2d 952 (N.J. 1980).
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4. Summary
In sum, although U.S. courts have applied the public policy
exception and refused to enforce judgments in specific types of
cases, U.S. courts have narrowly interpreted the public policy
exception and applied it on rare occasions.
IV. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S INTERPRETATION OF THE
PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION UNDER THE 1968 BRUSSELS
CONVENTION
A. Foundation of the Public Policy Exception
In 1968, the European Community negotiated the Brussels
Convention to "implement the provisions of Article 220 of [the
Treaty of Rome] by virtue of which they undertook to secure the
simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal recognition
and enforcement of judgments of courts or tribunals."87 Under
article 27 of the Brussels Convention, each contracting state has the
right to refuse recognition of a judgment "if such recognition is
contrary to public policy in the State in which recognition is
sought."'  The Lugano Convention contains an identical public
policy exception, which serves as a defense to recognition for EU
and EFTA states.89 Therefore, like the United States, both the
EU and the EFTA states have adopted a public policy exception
to the recognition of judgments from other member states.9°
The adoption of Protocol 3 on June 3, 1971 bestowed upon the
Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ) the power to
interpret the Brussels Convention.9 Like U.S. Courts the ECJ
87. Brussels Convention, supra note 3, pmbl.
88. Id. art. 27.
89. Lugano Convention, supra note 12, art. 27.
90. According to a report on the Brussels Convention by P. Jenard, the Director of the
Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External Trade, "[i]t is not the judgment itself
which must be against public policy for recognition thereof to the required to be refused,
but recognition itself." Jenard Report, 1979 O.J. (C 58/1) 44.
91. Protocol on the Interpretation of the 1968 Convention by the European Court,
June 3, 1971, amended by the Accession Convention, 1971 O.J. (L 304) 97. Subsequent
ECJ decisions interpreting the Brussels Convention public policy exception are also
relevant to the EFTA states. Protocol 2 of the Lugano Convention provides that the
"courts of each Contracting State shall, when applying and interpreting the provisions of
the Convention, pay due account to the principles laid down by any relevant decision
delivered by courts of the other Contracting States concerning provisions of the
Convention." Lugano Convention, supra note 12, Protocol 2.
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has narrowly interpreted the public policy exception and invoked
it on rare occasions.92  In fact, "it is commonly understood that
[the public policy exception] should be invoked only in extreme
cases."
93
B. European Community Enforcement of Foreign Awards
Consistent With Its Public Policy
Like U.S. courts, the ECJ has consistently refused to apply the
public policy exception and enforced foreign judgments in specific
types of cases.
1. Original Court's Lack of Jurisdiction
In accordance with article 28, paragraph 3 of the Brussels
Convention, the ECJ has refused to apply the public policy
exception in cases where the only objection to the enforcement of
a foreign judgment is founded upon the original court's exercise of
jurisdiction.94 Article 28 expressly states that article 27(1)'s test
of public policy may not be applied to the rules relating to jurisdic-
tion.95 One commentator describes the justification for Article 28
as follows: "The automatic application of recognition is consistent
with the principle of direct jurisdiction, where the rendering court
judge is required to verify his competency. Therefore, limiting the
discretion of the recognizing judge prevents time-consuming
92. See Case 220/83, Commission v. France, 1986 E.C.R. 3663,3672 [1985-1986 Transfer
Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,340, at 17,172 (Dec. 4, 1986) ("[C]ourts of the
State of the insurance company's domicile could rarely, if at all, refuse recognition of a
judgment delivered in France pursuant to Article 9 or Article 10 on the grounds that the
French requirements as to third party insurance were contrary to public policy."); Case
145/86, Hoffman v. Krieg, 1988 E.C.R. 645, 656, [1989] 2 CEC (CCH) 494, 507 (1988)
("[W]ithin the scheme of the Convention [the public policy exception] is intended to apply
only in exceptional cases, which will be all the rarer in that from a statistical point of view
judgments in property matters are unlikely to raise issues of public policy."); Case C-414/92,
Solo Kleinmotoren GmbH v. Boch, 1994 E.C.R. 1-2237, 1-2238 ("Article 27 of the
Convention must be interpreted strictly, inasmuch as it constitutes an obstacle to the
achievement of one of its fundamental objectives, which is to facilitate, to the greatest
extent possible, the free movement of judgments by providing for a simple and rapid
enforcement procedure."); Case C-123/91, Minalmet GmbH Brandeis, Ltd. (Nov. 12, 1992)
("L'article 27 constitue une exception b la regle generale enonc6e au premier alinea de
l'article 26 et, en tant que tel, doit etre interprete restrictivement.")
93. Volker Behr, Enforcement of United States Money Judgments in Germany, 13 J.L.
& COM. 211, 224 (1994).
94. Brussels Convention, supra note 3, art. 28, para. 3.
95. Id. The Brussels Convention is a double treaty that provides rules governing
jurisdiction.
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'double review,' and thus assures a speedy flow of judgment
recognition."'96 In essence, the aim of article 28 is to prevent the
enforcing state from reviewing the original court's jurisdiction
based on article 27(1)'s public policy exception.
Because this prohibition against jurisdictional review on public
policy grounds is an integral part of the Brussels Convention, it has
rarely been directly challenged. For example, in Bavaria
Fluggesellschaft Schwabe & Co., KG v. Eurocontrol,7 which in-
volved a Belgian judgment for air traffic control charges, the Bund-
esgerichtshof asked the ECJ to compare the Brussels Convention
with a prior bilateral convention between Belgium and Germa-
ny.98 In dicta, the ECJ explored the Brussels Convention's public
policy exception to compare the obstacles to enforcement. The
ECJ, however, suggested that the Brussels Convention denied an
enforcing court the right to review the original court's jurisdiction
because, as mandated by article 28, "the jurisdiction of the court of
the State in which the judgment was given may not be reviewed
[and] the test of public policy referred to in [a]rticle 27(1) may not
be applied to the rules relating to jurisdiction."" Thus, the ECJ
applied the bilateral treaty because the dispute involved a matter
of public international law, rather than a civil and commercial
matter.' °°
In Rohr v. Ossberger,°' the ECJ interpreted article 27(1)'s
public policy exception and required a French court to refuse
enforcement of a German judgment."°2 German procedural law
entitled the German court to adjudicate the substance of the
dispute, even though the defendant had restricted himself to
contesting the German court's jurisdiction. The defendant argued
96. Lee S. Bartlett, Full Faith and Credit Comes to the Common Market: An Analysis
of the Provisions of the Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, 24 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 44, 57 (1975).
97. Joined Cases 9 & 10/77, Bavaria Fluggesellschaft Schwabe & Co. KG v.
Eurocontrol, 1977 E.C.R. 1517, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
J 8428 (Jul. 14, 1977).
98. 1977 E.C.R. at 1524, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at
7653.
99. Brussels Convention, supra note 3, art. 28, para. 3.
100. 1977 E.C.R. at 1525-26, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
at 7653-54.
101. Case 27/81, Etablissements Rohr S.A. v. Ossberger, 1981 E.C.R. 2431, [1981-1983
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 8775 (Oct. 22, 1981):
102. 1981 E.C.R. 2431, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8775.
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that the public policy exception was applicable because German
procedure compelled the defendant to either submit a defense to
the substance of the claim or to limit his objection to jurisdiction,
which, if dismissed, would allow the court to enter a default
judgment against him." 3 The court rejected the defendant's
public policy defense and ruled that Article 18, which governs
establishment of jurisdiction through a defendant's appearance,
allowed the defendant not only to contest the original court's
jurisdiction, but also to submit an alternative defense to the
substance of the claim, without losing his right to object to the lack
of jurisdiction."
2. Original Court's Application of International Choice of Law
In addition, the ECJ has followed articles 29 and 34 of the
Brussels Convention and not applied the public policy exception to
cases where the original court has applied a law that differs from
the law that the enforcing court would have applied. Articles 29
and 34 proscribe an enforcing court from objecting to the original
court's application of its private international law rules. °5
In Elefanten Schuh GmbH v. Jacqmain,1° for example, the
defendant opposed an English court's enforcement of a Belgian
judgment based on public policy grounds.10 7  The defendant
argued that Belgium and England would interpret the disputed
contract clause differently, and thus, public policy required the
court to deny enforcement of the judgment. 8 The court rejected
the defendant's argument. According to the ECJ,
where the contract in which the jurisdiction clause is embedded
is valid or the jurisdiction agreement considered separately is a
valid one, it may be disregarded only in exceptional circum-
stances, where its operation would manifestly be incompatible
with the public policy of the forum. The fact that the jurisdic-
tion clause, or the agreement of which it forms a part, would be
103. 1981 E.C.R. at 2438, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at
7255.
104. 1981 E.C.R. at 2439, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at
7257.
105. Brussels Convention, supra note 3, arts. 29, 34.
106. Case 150/80, Elefanten Schuh GmbH v. Jacqmain, 1981 E.C.R. 1671, [1979-1981
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8765 (June 24, 1981).
107. 1981 E.C.R. 1681, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8765.
108. 1981 E.C.R. at 1683, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at
9178.
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void under a rule of the national law of the court seized of the
matter which that court has to apply of its own motion is not a
sufficient ground for invalidation."
Like the cases involving the enforcing court's review of the original
court's jurisdiction, the ECJ has been reluctant to apply article
27(1)'s public policy exception where the original and enforcing
courts would apply a different choice of law rule. This pattern is
consistent with the Brussels Convention's emphasis on limiting the
enforcing court's ability to review the original court's judgment."'
3. Defects in the Substance of the Original Court's Judgment
Furthermore, in accordance with articles 29 and 34, the ECJ
has refused to apply the public policy exception to cases where the
foreign judgment has arguable substantive defects. Both article 29,
which deals with recognition, and article 34, paragraph 3, which
deals with enforcement, prohibit review of the substance of the
original decision.' 1' The limited scope of the public policy excep-
tion "ensure[s] that [the enforcing court] cannot invoke its public
policy on the ground that it considers the judgment to be errone-
ous on the merits, whether the error is in the ascertainment of facts
or in the determination or application of law.""' 2
4. Summary
In sum, the ECJ has consistently refused to apply the public
policy exception in cases involving objections to the original court's
exercise of jurisdiction or the substance of the original court's
judgment. The ECJ has thus limited the scope of the public policy
exception, in accordance with provisions of the Brussels Conven-
tion.
109. 1981 E.C.R. at 1681, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at
9178.
110. Bartlett, supra note 96, at 9176-67.
111. Brussels Convention, supra note 3, arts. 29, 34. "Under no circumstances may a
foreign judgment be reviewed as to its substance." Id. art. 34, para. 3.
112. D. LASOK & P.A. STONE, CONFLICr OF LAWS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 299
(1987). But see KAYE, supra note 4, at 1442 ("Whether, on the other hand, Articles 29,
and 34, para. 3 also bar recognition- and enforcement-courts from examining the content
of the law applied by the judgment-court and the nature of its decision on substance, is
quite a different matter; and the effect of such a finding would be that operation of Article
27(1) would be limited to procedural irregularities in the judgment-court - as to which,
doubts might also even be felt to exist - and effects of judgment in recognition- or
enforcement-State.").
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C. European Community Denial of Enforcement of Foreign
Awards Contrary to Its Public Policy
The ECJ has also consistently applied the public policy excep-
tion and denied enforcement of other types of foreign judgments.
1. Maintenance Order Ancillary to a Divorce Decree
The ECJ has applied the public policy exception to deny the
enforcement of a maintenance order that was ancillary to a
divorce decree. In Hoffman v. Krieg,"3 the ECJ attempted to
reconcile a German maintenance order with a Netherlands divorce
judgment under Article 27(1)'s public policy exception." 4 The
ECJ held that a "foreign judgment ordering a person to make
maintenance payments to his spouse by virtue of his conjugal
obligations to support her is irreconcilable within the meaning of
Article 27(3) of the'Convention with a national judgment pro-
nouncing the divorce of the spouses."" 5 In effect, the German
order compelling the husband to pay maintenance to his wife was
unenforceable in Belgium because it implicitly required the Belgian
court to enforce the German divorce order, a result contrary to
Article 1 of the Brussels Convention.
2. Default Judgment
The ECJ has also denied enforcement of a foreign judgment
where the original court entered a default judgment against the
defendant. In Pendy Plastic Products B. V v. Pluspunkt
Handelsgesellschaft,"6 the ECJ decided whether a Netherlands
default judgment was valid, and therefore, precluded a German
court from refusing recognition of the judgment." 7 The ECJ
held that the Netherlands summons to the defendant did not
constitute adequate notice under its laws and allowed the German
court to deny enforcement of the Netherlands judgment.1' 8 In
113. Case 145/86, Hoffman v. Krieg, 1988 E.C.R. 645, [1989] 2 CEC (CCH) 494 (1988).
114. 1988 E.C.R. at 668, [1989] 2 CEC (CCH) at 521.
115. 1988 E.C.R. at 669, [1989] 2 CEC (CCH) at 523.
116. Case 228/81, Pendy Plastic Products B.V. v. Pluspunkt Handelsgesellschaft mbH,
1982 E.C.R. 2723, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8853 (July
15, 1982).
117. 1982 E.C.R. 2723, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8853.
118. 1982 E.C.R. at 2724, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at
8059.
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making its decision, the ECJ accepted the argument that "it would
be objectionable to oblige the court in the State in which enforce-
ment is sought to recognize a judgment in circumstances where the
defendant had been denied the right to a fair hearing in the State
in which the judgment was given.""'  In addition, the ECJ stated
that "even where service has been duly effected, recognition can be
refused if the court in which recognition is sought considers that
the document was not served in sufficient time to enable the
defendant to arrange his defense.""12 This exception to enforce-
ment, like the exception for a divorce maintenance order, reveals
the limited application of article 27(1), which is often cited in
conjunction with another convention provision, in this case, article
27(2).121
3. Lease of Real Property
The ECJ, however, has interpreted the public policy exception
to deny enforcement of a foreign judgment without explicit
reference to another provision in the Brussels Convention. In
Scherrens v. Maenhout,122 for example, the ECJ examined the
issue of exclusive jurisdiction in a dispute over a lease of real
property situated in Belgium and the Netherlands. 23  Article
16(1) of the Brussels Convention gives exclusive jurisdiction to the
country where immovable property is located.' 24 The ECJ held
that "[a]rticle 16(1) .. . must therefore be interpreted as meaning
that, in a dispute as to the existence of a lease relating to immov-
able property situated in two contracting States, exclusive jurisdic-
tion over the immovable property situated in each contracting state
is held by the courts of that State."'5 The court accepted the
119. 1982 E.C.R. at 2725, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at
8060 (citing Case 125/79, Denilauler v. S.N.C. Couchet FrZres, 1980 E.C.R. 1553, 1569,
[1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. T 8679, at 8039 (May 21, 1980)).
120. 1982 E.C.R. at 2725, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at
8061 (citing Jenard Report, supra -note 90).
121. Case C-123/91, Minalmet GmbH Brandeis, Ltd. (Nov. 12, 1992) ("La Commission
observe egalement que compte tenu du rapport entre les points 1 et 2 de I'article 27, ni les
elements constitutifs, ni les consequences juridiques de l'article 27, point 2 ne sont a la
disposition des parties. En effet, l'article 27, point 2 enonce un cas d'application particulier
de l'ordre public.").
122. Case 158/87, Scherrens v. Maenhout, 1988 E.C.R. 3791, [1990] 2 CEC (CCH) 8
(1988).
123. 1988 E.C.R. at 3804, [1990] 2 CEC (CCH) at 27.
124. Brussels Convention, supra note 3, art. 16, para. 1.
125. 1988 E.C.R. at 3805, [1990] 2 CEC (CCH) at 29.
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written observation submitted to the court that "it seems contrary
to public policy to export Belgian law on agricultural holdings to
the Netherlands." 1 26  The ECJ effectively granted exclusive
jurisdiction to each member state for the portion of immovable
property located within its geographic borders. The court
supported this conclusion by arguing that the law of immovable
property was closely bound up with the law of tenancies and that
the court in the jurisdiction in which the property is located is in
a better position to obtain first-hand knowledge over the creation
of the tenancy and the performance of its terms.
127
4. Summary
In sum, the ECJ has relied on the Brussels Convention's public
policy exception to deny the enforcement of foreign judgments in
a few limited situations. With one minor exception, the public
policy exception has served as a defense only in conjunction with
another valid provision of the Brussels Convention. For example,
article 1 proscribed the enforcement of a maintenance order that
was ancillary to a divorce decree. Likewise, article 27(2) prohibited
the enforcement of a default judgment that was entered against a
defendant without proper service of process. The ECJ interpreted
the public policy exception in isolation only in Scherrens and
denied enforcement of a real property lease judgment. This
exception, however, is too-fact driven to lead to public policy
exception abuse. Therefore, the EU and EFTA states, through the
actions of the ECJ, are not likely to abuse the public policy
exception..
V. ANALYSIS
Implicit in this examination of the scope of the public policy
exception is recognizing that the adoption of a multilateral Hague
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments is a necessary step to optimize the benefits of the
recently increased economic and legal integration in the interna-
tional community. This integration is clearly displayed in the
creation of the European Economic -Community, the North
American Free Trade Agreement, and the World Trade Organiza-
126. 1988 E.C.R. at 3793, [19901 2 CEC (CCH) at 17.
127. 1988 E.C.R. at 3804, [1990] 2 CEC (CCH) at 27.
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tion. According to some scholars,
in order for an economic union to function efficiently, a legal
judgment-like any other property interest-must not have its
value impaired merely by crossing a geographic border within
the union, and both the property interest represented by the
judgment, and the legal mechanism for enforcing rights in that
property interest must be respected throughout the union.1
28
The existing framework for multilateral enforcement of foreign
judgments is not broad enough to accommodate the recent growth
in international economic cooperation. As a result, the upcoming
Hague Conference will facilitate international recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments.
A. The Contracting States Are Likely to Narrowly Interpret the
Public Policy Exception
The Hague Conference is unlikely to broadly construe a public
policy exception. Both the United States and the European
Community have narrowly applied the exception. In addition, the
United States, the European Community and European Free Trade
Area states comprise 47.3% of the Hague Conference mem-
bers.2 9  Furthermore, they control approximately 75% of the
GDP, as well as 72% of the exports from, and 75% of the imports
into, Hague Conference member states.13' Because little more
than international comity compelled these states and regions to
narrowly apply the public policy exception, a multilateral Hague
Conference will likely continue to narrowly apply the exception.
Most Hague Conference member states presently utilize a
public policy exception in their respective domestic judgments
law.131 "All European jurisdictions deny enforcement where the
enforcement of the foreign judgment would contravene domestic
public policy.' 13 Thus, the United States, the individual Europe-
128. Ronald A. Brand, Recognition of Foreign Judgments as a Trade Law Issue: The,
Economics of Private International Law, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Jagdeep Bhandari & Alan 0. Sykes eds., forthcoming) (manuscript at 2, on file with
author); see New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, done June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New
York Convention].
129. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1995: WORKERS IN AN
INTEGRATING WORLD (1995) (calculation from. tables).
130. Id.
131. Behr, supra note 93, at 221.
132. Id.
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an states, and the EU and EFTA states already apply some form
of public policy exception in their respective judgments law. An
extension of the exception through the Hague Convention will do
little more than formalize these existing practices on a multilateral
level.
Moreover, the common law interpreting the public policy
exception of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention),133 a multi-
lateral convention including many international signatories, suggests
that the Hague Conference will not abuse the public policy
exception even though the member states vary drastically in the
areas of financial wealth, influence and international independence.
In fact, courts interpreting the New York Convention may have
even erred on the side of overly restricting its public policy
exception. Scholar HAkan Berglin noted: "it has been said by some
that 'the courts have given the public policy defense so narrow a
construction that it now must be characterized as a defense without
meaningful definition [and consequently leaves] the defense
pragmatically useless if not altogether nonexistent.' ""3 In 1984,
Giorgio Gaja, editor of International Commercial Arbitration: New
York Convention, found that 190 cases around the world applied
the New York Convention and noted that only six of these cases
dealt directly with the public policy defense. 35 The public policy
exception has not been a significant problem in the existing and
heterogenous New York Convention. Therefore, member states of
the Hague Conference should not be concerned that the heteroge-
nous states will broaden the public policy exception as to render
the convention moot.
B. The Public Policy Exception as Political Tool
The public policy exception is an essential political tool to
133. New York Convention, supra note 126. The United States implemented the
convention through Pub. L. No. 91-368, 84 Stat. 692 (1977) (codified as amended at 9
U.S.C.A. §§ 201-208 (West 1988 & Supp. III 1991)). The text of the New York Convention
can be found immediately following 9 U.S.C.A. § 201 (West Supp. 1993).
134. HAkan Berglin, The Application in United States Courts of the Public Policy
Provision of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 4 DICK. J. INT'L L. 167, 169 (1986) (footnote omitted).
135. Richard A. Cole, Note, The Public Policy Exception to the New York Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, 1 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
365, 375-76 (1986).
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encourage reluctant member states to join the Hague Convention
because it serves as a "safety valve" for unforeseeable changes in
the law. As Professor Behr suggests, "[i]n the short term, the
public policy requirement is indispensable. Moreover, in the long
,run, it is sensible to preserve an ultimate safeguard against
unforeseen and unforeseeable divergences between domestic law
and the laws of different jurisdictions. ' ' 136 In fact, the inclusion
of the public policy exception in the Brussels Convention was
"excused, on the ground that it was seen to be an essential 'safety-
valve', which would facilitate ratification of the Convention by
Member States, jealous of preserving existing fundamental controls
on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.' ' 137 It may
be better to include a mechanism where a member state may "base
refusal of [enforcement and recognition of a foreign judgment]
upon a Convention provision, however vague, [rather] than
'deliberately ... violate the text of an international treaty.' "138
Consequently, the public policy exception is an absolutely neces-
sary political measure to the adoption of the Hague Convention
because it counters the fears of recalcitrant countries.
VI. CONCLUSION
The inclusion of a public policy exception in the multilateral
Hague Conference requires a "political" leap of faith by the
member states, which some believe will result in the demise of a
convention that is important to the increased mobility of interna-
tional judgments. The dilemma may be described as follows:
Strict resort to public policy, especially at the start of the
Convention's life, will probably seem excessive. Hopefully, it
will quickly come to be appreciated by judicial authorities of
Contracting States that it is preferable to play the game of free
circulation of judgments frankly than to attempt to place
obstacles in the path thereof in the guise of public policy. The
view here is that the best protection for litigants (and their
advisers) is to gain experience in presenting their case before
foreign courts, rather than to rely on vague delaying tactics. As
for Contracting State judges, they will quickly discover that the
best method for securing authority for their own judgments is to
136. Behr, supra note 93, at 224.
137. KAYE, supra note 4, at 1437.
138. Id.
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accord the maximum respect to those of their foreign col-
leagues.
139
The empirical data, however, suggest that the United States,
EU and EFTA states, and New York Convention member states
have not exhibited the rampant denial of enforcement that
doubters of the public policy exception fear. Furthermore, the
benefits of increased enforcement of foreign judgments, which most
agree is a laudable goal, may not be realized unless precisely such
a "safety valve" is included in the convention. Many countries will
refuse to ratify a convention based upon political rather than
strictly theoretical grounds.
[I]t can be appreciated that the exceptional provision for refusal
made under Article 27 ... as a whole is an essential Convention
mechanism for enabling Contracting States otherwise to accept
the general principal [sic] of automatic enforcement and that an
essential component part of that mechanism, broad in its
potential scope, yet restrained in its actual operation, is the
public policy refusal ground in Article 27(1). 4°
Therefore, the public policy exception should be included in the
upcoming Hague Conference on the Enforcement and Recognition
of Foreign Judgments in October 1996. It is the only method to
ensure the continuation of the long awaited integration of the
international community.
139. Id. at 1442.
140. Id. at 1444.
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